Why Did So Many European Colonies Gain Independence After World War II?

 

Introduction

Why does France still want a presence in its many African ex-colonies e.g. Mali by sending French troops especially Regiments of the Foreigh Legion there?

The chart above from www.ourworldindata.org shows that from a peak of approximately 100 colonies less than a century ago, there are now only 17 non-self-governing countries in the world.  And most of these are small and/or remote territories. The 17 non-self-governing territories include Western Sahara, Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Island, Falkland Islands, Montserrat, Saint Helena, Turks and Caicos Islands, United States Virgin Islands, Gibraltar, American Samoa, French Polynesia, Guam, New Caledonia, Pitcairn, and Tokelau.

No. of colonies by country in 1925: UK: 55, France:26, Belgium 2, Italy 3, Netherlands 2, Portugal 6, Spain 2. 

Why did the ex-European empires relinquish their hold over so many countries post-WWII?

1. Fiscal exhaustion: War debts + post-war welfare-state spending left little room for colonial garrisons.
2. U.S.–Soviet pressure: Both superpowers (for opposite ideological reasons) opposed old empires and used UN fora to delegitimise them.
3. Rising local education & nationalism: Wartime officer training and propaganda (“fight for freedom”) armed colonial elites with organisational tools.
4. Demographic asymmetry: European settler minorities (except Algeria, Kenya, Rhodesia) could no longer monopolise force once native soldiers were conscripted/enlisted in large numbers.
5. Declining strategic value of certain bases as air-refuelling, container shipping and Cold-War alliances changed logistics (e.g., Suez superseded by Diego Garcia, nuclear-sub fleets).
6. Moral climate: Atlantic Charter (Aug 1941), UN Charter (1945) and Bandung Conference (1955) re-framed empire as illegitimate.

Why does France still want a presence in its many African ex-colonies e.g. Mali by sending French troops especially Regiments of the Foreigh Legion there?

France’s repeated decision to intervene militarily in its former African possessions—most recently in Mali, the Sahel and the Central African Republic—rests on a mixture of hard-security calculations, economic interests, domestic politics and the legacy of “Françafrique.”  

1. Counter-terrorism and homeland security • Sahelian jihadist networks (AQIM, JNIM, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara) actively plan or inspire attacks in France. • Stopping those groups while they are still in remote desert zones is cheaper—politically and financially—than defending the French mainland alone. • Paris therefore treats Mali, Niger and Chad as an “outer ring” of defence; since 2013 roughly 50 % of French overseas combat sorties have been flown over the Sahel (Operations Serval, Barkhane, now “Aigle”).

2. Protection of French citizens, companies and critical resources • France has 150,000 nationals, hundreds of firms and €40-45 billion in FDI spread across francophone Africa. • EDF, TotalEnergies and Orano (formerly Areva) depend on Nigerien uranium; French banks (BNPP, Société Générale) dominate West-African finance. • Rapid-reaction troops reassure shareholders and insurers whenever a host government collapses (e.g., Mali 2012, Chad 2021, Niger 2023).

3. Geo-political leverage in multilateral forums • The presence of 4,000–5,000 soldiers, airfields (Niamey, N’Djamena, Abidjan) and special-forces “lily-pad” bases gives France disproportionate weight inside the EU Common Security and Defence Policy and NATO’s southern flank planning. • France amplifies its global voice by acting as the de-facto security guarantor for 14 franc-zone states that together hold 54 votes in UN organs and Francophonie institutions.

4. Competition with new external actors • Moscow’s Wagner Group, Turkish Bayraktar-armed missions and fast-growing Chinese police contingents are eroding French influence. • Paris calculates that a visible military footprint deters coups that might realign host states toward Russia or Turkey and jeopardise French commercial concessions.

5. Migration management for domestic politics • Most irregular migrants reaching France via the Central Mediterranean travel through Niger and Mali. • Sahel deployments help Paris bargain with local governments to police migrant routes—useful in French elections where migration is a potent issue.

6. Alliance requests and UN mandates • Operations are often initiated by formal invitations from host presidents (Mali 2013, Niger 2020, CAR 2014) and re-badged under UN or EU banners to share costs (MINUSMA, EUTM Mali). • By responding, France secures reciprocal African support for its own UN agenda (e.g., climate-security resolutions)

7. Why the Foreign Legion in particular? • Expeditionary design: 7,000 of its 9,000 soldiers are permanently posted outside continental France; entire regiments (2e REP, 13e DBLE) are trained for desert warfare and parachute insertion. • Political “buffer”: The Legion is composed of foreign volunteers under French officers; casualties generate less domestic backlash than losses in conscript-heavy units. • Flexible legal status: Legionnaires can be moved quickly without invoking EU or NATO decision chains and can operate under purely French rules of engagement. • Branding power: The Legion’s mystique signals resolve to friends and foes alike, reinforcing the diplomatic message that Paris is prepared to act unilaterally if coalitions falter.

In short, France’s post-colonial deployments are less about neo-imperial nostalgia and more about a contemporary blend of counter-terrorism, economic security, diplomatic leverage and domestic political calculus—carried out by the Foreign Legion because it is the most adaptable, expendable and symbolically potent tool in the French arsenal.